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Summary 
It has been argued that the global harmonisation of animal health procedures, 
regulations and responses will improve animal health and provide economic 
benefits. Harmonisation of regulations can be driven by trade reform, such as 
multilateral or bilateral agreements, or as a response to private quality assurance 
programmes.
At an international level, trade reform is currently focused on reducing the costs of 
trading between countries. To achieve this, bilateral agreements, where possible, 
are harmonising regulations throughout all sectors of the economy. However, 
as with any new developments, there are both positive and negative outcomes 
that should be explored to understand the net effect of these changes on animal 
health, the economy and society. 
In this article, the authors debate the economic foundations of harmonisation, 
explore alternative methods to achieve it, and discuss its pros and cons to more 
fully understand the opportunity costs from countries adopting the same level of 
risk to animal health.
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Introduction
With major gains from tariff reform being realised, trade 
reform policy has shifted its focus towards the removal of 
non-tariff barriers and the harmonisation of regulations to 
increase the economic gains from trade integration. As the 
differences in regulatory frameworks between countries 
decrease, the costs of doing business between those 
countries also decrease, and a wider range of goods can 
enter the market at lower prices, thus benefiting consumers. 
This is the law of comparative advantage that underpins 
free trade (1). 
Harmonisation of regulations can provide real economic 
and social gains, especially in countries where regulations 
and institutions are lax (2). Therefore, the drive for 
harmonisation has become central to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) and the quest for economic growth. 
Additionally, the adoption of private regulations can enable 
some individuals to take advantage of niche markets and 
higher prices by meeting social preferences (3). 
However, the gains from harmonisation have been 
challenged by two central arguments. The first states that 
analyses typically only search for a positive impact on one 
sector of an economy from harmonisation (4), and fail to 
consider the complex spillover effects (both positive and 
negative) that this change may have across all sectors of 
society and the economy (5, 6, 7). 
The second explains that trade is about ‘games of power’ 
and that a country’s hegemony can influence the level of 
harmonisation to benefit its own economy and not that of its 
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trade partners (8). Thus, a failure to understand the complex 
changes from harmonisation, i.e. information asymmetry, 
may lead to regulatory capture (9) and to a country 
adopting a level of risk (e.g. attitudes to antibiotic use, 
food health standards) that was unpalatable to its residents 
before harmonisation (10, 11). As Hassoun (12) reflects, the 
design and implementation of harmonisation may actually 
reinforce conditions of poverty and inequality within a 
country. Not every country has enjoyed harmonisation, and 
the cost of re-establishing a country’s independence to set 
its own regulations comes at a cost. By the end of 2020, 
it is predicted that the United Kingdom’s (UK’s) economy 
will have lost £ 200 billion in four years during ‘Brexit’, the 
departure of the UK from the European Union (EU) (13). 
Animal health harmonisation creates both positive and 
negative effects on a country, but its true impact may 
only be fully realised once harmonisation has been either 
implemented or removed. Therefore, careful debate before 
either the implementation or the dissolution of harmonised 
regulations is required, to consider the wider impacts 
on society. The discussion is complex, as animal health 
harmonisation applies equally to:
− production inputs, e.g. the registration of pharmaceuticals, 
feedstuffs
− regulated husbandry practices, e.g. cage size, animal 
welfare practices, and slaughter protocols
− output definitions, e.g. what age is veal?
− protocols for international animal health emergencies, 
e.g. defined rules to apportion costs and responsibilities 
when dealing with animal diseases, their prevention, 
detection, and treatment (14). 
To explore this multifaceted problem, this article first 
outlines the basic economic foundations associated with 
harmonisation, then debates how harmonisation can 
occur via alternative government agreements and private 
interventions. The pros and cons from harmonisation are 
then examined and final comments provided.
Harmonisation and trade 
The economics of harmonisation and trade focus on the 
impacts on producers and consumers. Let us consider the 
case of two countries (Country 1 and Country 2) seeking to 
harmonise regulations on beef health requirements (Fig. 1). 
Country 1 has lower animal health standards and production 
costs. In this country, producers can sell a kilogram (kg) of 
beef at a certain price P1. At this price, consumers will buy 
Q1 kgs of beef. Country 2 has more stringent animal health 
regulations, and producers must charge P2 to remain viable, 



























D1 : demand for beef in Country 2
DL : demand for beef in Country 1
P1 : price of beef in Country 1
P2 : price of beef in Country 2
PH : price of beef after harmonisation
Fig. 1
How trade harmonisation changes market prices, production and demand
Q1 : quantity of beef bought in Country 1
Q2 : quantity of beef bought in Country 1 after harmonisation
QA : quantity of beef bought in Country 2
QB  : quantity of beef bought in Country 2 after harmonisation
SL1 : domestic beef supply in Country 1
SL2 : domestic beef supply in Country 1 after harmonisation
SN1 : domestic beef supply in Country 2
SN2 : domestic beef supply in Country 2 after harmonisation
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If the costs of harmonisation allow beef to be sold at 
PH/kg, then regulations have increased Country 1’s costs 
and decreased Country 2’s costs. Now the quantity of beef 
consumed in Country 1 falls to Q2 while in Country 2, 
the quantity of beef being bought increases to QB. In this 
example, there are winners and losers in harmonisation, and 
economics can provide an understanding of the likelihood 
of these impacts across society.
What the basic story of harmonisation neglects is: who 
sets the standards and second-round effects of change? For 
example, if standards were set to Country 2 levels, Country 1 
may not be able to produce any beef. Alternatively, if 
Country 1’s standards were adopted, they may introduce a 
level of risk that results in adverse animal and human health 
impacts from outbreaks of exotic disease (10). Additionally, 
second-round effects of change can negatively affect profits, 
leading to structural change in the production sector and 
labour redistribution (15, 16, 17). 
Both theoretically and practically, these are vital issues in 
the harmonisation of animal health regulations. The next 
section explores the private or public mechanisms that set 
in motion the process of harmonisation.
Harmonisation standards: public 
versus private?
Harmonisation can be implemented in three ways. The 
first is via multilateral agreements through the WTO; the 
second is via bilateral agreements (between two countries) 
or plurilateral agreements (among three or more countries); 
and the third is through the introduction of private 
standards.
Multilateral trade agreements: the World Trade 
Organization Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 
With 164 Member Countries and 24 observer nations 
(www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.
htm#observer), the WTO provides a unified platform for 
negotiations to develop rules for trade in goods, services 
and intellectual property, and to deal with disputes. Central 
to the discussion here is the argument that an individual 
country’s control is diminished in a larger group and as 
these processes unfold (18). 
The WTO recognises several relevant international 
standard-setting bodies as responsible for developing the 
global standards for trade harmonisation in the areas of 
animal and plant health and food safety. This is enshrined 
in the WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), which was 
adopted in 1995 (19). This Agreement sets out the rights 
and obligations (and exceptions) for WTO Members with 
respect to measures that address animal and plant health 
risks, and food safety risks. Specifically, the SPS Agreement 
relies on three international standard-setting bodies (also 
known as the ‘Three Sisters’ of this Agreement) for developing 
SPS-related standards, guidelines and recommendations:
− the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE), which 
specifies animal-health-related standards
− the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection 
Convention (IPPC), which specifies plant health standards
− the Codex Alimentarius Commission, which specifies 
food-safety-related standards, including acceptable levels of 
chemical use in food production systems (e.g. maximum 
residue limits).
In this respect, the SPS Agreement views harmonisation 
as the procedure by which countries base their SPS 
regulations on the international standards, guidelines or 
recommendations developed by the Three Sisters, and the 
Agreement encourages countries in this process. 
Although the Three Sisters set the standards, each country 
can still set its own appropriate level of protection (ALOP) 
and standards if it bases these adjustments on science. The 
ALOP is the level of risk to a country’s economy, ecosystem 
and human population that a country is willing to accept 
from being involved in trade. 
Bilateral and plurilateral trade agreements
Reaching consensus in multilateral agreements is a laborious 
process and countries engage in bilateral/plurilateral 
agreements, often called ‘Free Trade Agreements’ (FTAs), to 
avoid protracted negotiations.
However, harmonising animal health and food safety 
regulations through this bilateral/plurilateral process can 
result in a set of mutually agreed regulations that differ from 
those recognised under the SPS Agreement.
In this situation, the ALOP among countries is harmonised 
and, in certain situations, the regulatory authority can 
move away from public institutions towards corporate 
power. Labonté et al. (7) detail the impact of the Agreement 
between the United States of America (USA), the United 
Mexican States and Canada (USMCA) on Mexico and 
Canada and the transfer of power to USA corporations in 
the public health sector. Moreover, the desire to harmonise 
with the US ALOP resulted in the removal of Canada’s right 
to use dispute settlement to resolve investor state disputes.
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Redirection towards corporate control may create outcomes 
where those who set the risk are not responsible for dealing 
with the negative outcomes from that risk. It is within 
bilateral/plurilateral settings that ‘games of power’ become 
evident and are pivotal in strategically manipulating the 
outcome of the deal (8). Consequently, rarely do FTAs lead 
to free trade. Rather, FTAs stipulate a set of conditions that 
solidify advantage to one or more countries at the expense 
of another.
Private standards
Private standards or quality assurance programmes can 
be ‘top down’ (e.g. from an oligopolistic purchaser) (20), 
or ‘bottom up’ (e.g. determined by consumer 
preferences) (3, 21). Such standard-setting programmes 
operate as a signalling mechanism between 
producers, retailers and consumers (22). While 
social expectations may drive private standards and 
provide incentives for producers to meet the desires of 
the public, they are not regulations (23). Nevertheless, 
failure to comply with these private standards may still 
result in some form of penalty, such as receiving a lower 
price or being denied market access. Private standards are 
considered a ‘mixed blessing’, as they can both enhance the 
SPS Agreement and, in some situations, be considered a 
barrier to trade (24, 25).
In countries with weak institutions, the adoption 
of basic private standards may provide significant 
gains in terms of economic activity and animal 
welfare (26), but in countries with strong institutions, the 
gains are likely to be lesser. In some situations, private 
standards can be a response to creative marketing, when 
a lack of information or misinformation is used to gain a 
greater share of a market through fear. The 2016 hormone-
free beef promotion from fast-food chain Hungry Jack’s is 
one such example (27). 
Why harmonise?
Central to the debate about harmonisation is the question: 
‘why would a country be willing to give up the sovereign 
right to set its own regulations?’ Whose regulations should 
countries adopt and are these standards higher or lower 
than those set by the international standard-setting bodies 
recognised by the WTO SPS Agreement? Moreover, do 
all signatories of a trade deal benefit equally? The way in 
which harmonisation is put into practice has a considerable 
influence on the benefits that may or may not accrue. To 
harmonise or not to harmonise is thus a problematic choice. 
In the following section, the authors outline the common 
pros and cons of harmonisation in both the public and 
private sector. 
Possible positive effects of 
animal health harmonisation
The five points below summarise the harmonisation debate, 
when harmonisation is defined only as the removal of 
barriers. In some cases, harmonisation can lead to more 
regulation but that possibility is not examined here.
a) The harmonisation of regulations and the cutting of red 
tape will improve efficiency (28) and reduce costs (29). 
This argument relies on the comparative advantages in 
reducing compliance, labour and paper work costs once 
harmonisation has occurred, as well as ‘unpleasant surprises’ 
that may cause delays in access to markets or consignments 
being refused. However, harmonisation may also lead to 
decreased competition in the long run. For example, if 
domestic conditions before harmonisation allowed the 
development of monopolies and oligopolies, then those 
companies may go out of business once regulations are 
harmonised. If that occurs, there is a possibility that the 
surviving company/companies may revert to monopolistic 
or oligopolistic behaviour in the long term (30).
b) Government regulatory institutions and legal frameworks 
are unable to keep pace with improvements in technology. 
If a multilateral regulation and verification process were 
adopted (i.e. if an object passed the regulations standards 
in one country, it would automatically pass the regulations 
in another country), the rate at which new goods enter 
the market would increase, and all cost savings could be 
diverted into further research or price reductions.
This argument ‘sells’ the idea that the next miracle cure is 
on the horizon (31), or that regulations are preventing a 
new practice which could unshackle current production 
constraints (32).
c) The cost of developing good institutions can be prohibitive 
for some countries and their limited public funds would be 
better allocated to some other activity. In other words, if a 
country with good institutions deems the practice safe, then 
a country with under-resourced institutions can benefit 
from adopting the findings of other countries. In this case, 
the opportunity cost of having sound science should not 
be put in the way of helping resource-strapped countries 
gain from the introduction of good veterinary practices and 
drugs (33).
In such circumstances, harmonisation can be of particular 
benefit if there are few animal health products currently 
being used. By understanding the concepts of diminishing 
marginal benefits, there are significant gains from the 
introduction of basic animal health inputs to production. 
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d) Greater market certainty, freedom and profits will 
encourage a new wave of funding, leading to potential 
new cures in areas where little research is currently being 
undertaken (34). 
e) Clearly defined and harmonious procedures and cost-
sharing mechanisms for dealing with emergency veterinary 
responses will reduce the costs of dealing with emergency 
outbreaks. A potential pooling of resources may take place, 
reducing the costs of monitoring and enforcement.
By harmonising procedures, not only should the time 
required to deal with an emergency issue be reduced, but 
disruption in trade should also be minimised, as attitudes to 
risk are homogeneous, and disputes avoided.
The arguments for harmonisation via private standards may 
be theoretically compelling at a basic level, as they demand 
the removal of unnecessary government interference in the 
market, and assert that, by creating a level playing field, the 
best provider will emerge victorious in a competitive market. 
In such a classical foundation, two key assumptions must 
hold: markets must be perfect and private institutions must 
be fundamentally more efficient than government agencies. 
These assumptions are based more on faith than on fact. 
Health, food safety and animal welfare are a combination of 
both private and public goods, and those markets are prone 
to market failure and under-investment (35). Consequently, 
rules and regulations are designed not only to address those 
market failures (36), but to reflect society’s expectations, 
minimise the risk of adverse events, and, in part, ensure 
there is some balance between those who create the risks 
and those who are severely affected by adverse events (9). 
Gray (11) suggests that applying static neo-classical 
economic models to the question of regulatory integration 
supports harmonisation, in that it facilitates the free 
movement of direct investment, technology and labour, 
but ignores the cost of diminishing a nation’s right to self-
governance and wider social settings. This includes animal 
health. It is therefore prudent to also examine the potential 
negative impacts of harmonisation. 
Possible negative effects of 
harmonisation
A series of studies have challenged the argument that greater 
deregulation is always beneficial.
a) The harmonisation of ALOP implies that all countries 
share the same opportunity costs (35) and have the same 
values and attitudes to the precautionary principle. (This 
is patently not the case. For example, Europe and the USA 
have opposing views on the use of growth-promoting 
hormones in animal production.) The precautionary 
principle suggests that, in cases where there is a risk but 
insufficient information, waiting to collect new information 
provides net social gains (37). Regulations are designed to 
collect data, prevent the concentration of market power, 
avoid unintended consequences and reflect society’s values 
(9). Before harmonisation is sought, decision-makers need 
to truly understand the changes caused to all sectors of the 
economy before they can determine its benefits. 
b) In the case of public health, the reduction in regulations 
has not led to an expansion of private research funding or 
necessarily to a reduction in costs. Rather, Baker et. al. (5) 
found that harmonisation of intellectual property rights 
reduced economic welfare, due to the decreasing number 
of pharmaceutical firms, which enabled them to increase 
their prices. With the global animal health pharmaceutical 
market dominated by ten key firms, and high ‘up-front’ 
fixed costs as the barrier to entry (38), harmonisation may 
lead to fewer firms, resulting in higher animal health costs.
c) Whiting (39) suggested that a consistent ALOP can lead to 
the freedom of animal movement between countries, which 
could introduce exotic diseases into naïve populations. This 
issue was raised with regard to the trade deal between the 
USA and Canada, with the threat of anaplasmosis spilling 
over into the Canadian herd. 
d) Adamson (10) highlighted the danger of hegemonic 
relationships in harmonisation by taking the example of a 
small country which is also a net exporter. He used Australia 
as the net exporting ‘small country’ (with a domestic market 
of 24.5 million people), and noted that 80–90% of Australia’s 
agricultural income is derived from export earnings. Thus, 
if market access is denied, the domestic population cannot 
consume the excess production, leading to price reductions. 
In this case, not only is the industry that is denied market 
access in trouble, but all industry substitutes are also affected 
as they suddenly face competition at a much lower price. In 
extreme situations, this could lead to a sudden reduction in 
national herd size, and a long-term loss of export markets 
to competitors. 
Conclusions
While there can be great gains from harmonisation, the 
choice to harmonise is a sovereign right. The benefits and 
risks of harmonisation are not constant across countries, 
nor are all regulations a burden on society. It is up to 
individual countries to determine if their regulations should 
be harmonised. Further, the level of risk that a country is 
willing to accept from harmonisation needs to be debated 
in a public forum.
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The desire to harmonise may originate with net exporters, net 
importers, or those countries aiming to gain market access 
for goods. Considering the specifics of the production sector 
involved, the risk of adverse or unintended consequences 
and the potential redistributive effects is essential, as not all 
countries and not all economies are the same. Care must be 
taken to consider who is setting the standards, and which 
countries bear the cost of adopting harmonised standards.
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Les avantages et les inconvénients de l’harmonisation 
dans le domaine de la santé animale 
D. Adamson, W. Gilbert, P. Rothman-Ostrow & J. Rushton
Résumé
Il a souvent été avancé qu’en matière de santé animale, l’harmonisation des 
procédures, des réglementations et des interventions à l’échelle mondiale 
améliore la situation zoosanitaire globale tout en apportant des bénéfices 
économiques aux pays. Une telle harmonisation réglementaire peut être le fruit 
d’une réforme du commerce, notamment par le biais d’accords multilatéraux ou 
bilatéraux, ou bien constituer une réponse aux programmes d’assurance qualité 
privés.
Au niveau international, la réforme du commerce est actuellement centrée sur 
la réduction des coûts qu’il entraîne pour les pays. Dans cette perspective, des 
accords bilatéraux sont conclus chaque fois que possible afin d’harmoniser les 
réglementations dans tous les secteurs de l’économie. Néanmoins, comme dans 
toute évolution nouvelle, il en résulte des retombées aussi bien positives que 
négatives qu’il convient d’analyser afin de bien comprendre l’incidence nette de 
ces changements sur la santé animale, l’économie et la société. 
Après avoir débattu des fondements économiques de l’harmonisation, les auteurs 
examinent les méthodes alternatives qui permettent d’obtenir le même résultat ; 
ils font aussi le point sur les avantages et les inconvénients de l’harmonisation 
afin de mieux comprendre le coût d’opportunité qu’elle induit pour les pays 
adoptant le même niveau de risque en santé animale. 
Mots-clés
Échanges internationaux – Effets indésirables – Harmonisation – Réglementation – Santé 
animale. 
Ventajas e inconvenientes de la armonización en el ámbito 
de la sanidad animal
D. Adamson, W. Gilbert, P. Rothman-Ostrow & J. Rushton
Resumen
Se ha postulado que la armonización mundial de los procedimientos, reglamentos 
y respuestas en materia de sanidad animal redundará en un mejor estado sanitario 
de los animales y reportará beneficios económicos. El impulso para proceder 
a una armonización reglamentaria puede tener su origen en una reforma del 
comercio, a raíz por ejemplo de acuerdos multilaterales o bilaterales, o responder 
a programas privados de garantía de la calidad.
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